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In this regard, the Court deferred to state law in finding there was a
binding contractual obligation to redeem the stock from Blount's estate,
despite the fact that the buyout agreement was held invalid for purposes of
valuing the corporation for estate tax purposes.
19

In arriving at this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit cited as precedent an
opinion of the Ninth Circuit and an earlier decision of the Tax Court:
Cartwright v. Comm'r, 183 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999) and Huntsman
v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 861, 875 (1976).
20

IRC § 2042.

21

Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (as amended in 1979).

22

Treas. Reg.§ 20.2042-1(c)(6).

23

Referring to Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(t).

24

Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).

25

See True v. Comm'r, 390 F.3d 1210, 1239-41 (lOth Cir. 2004) (collecting
cases that both support and disregard provisions in buyout agreement
setting value).
26

Under the "rule of the circuit," the Tax Court is required to follow the
rule of the circuit court in which the litigation arose (i.e. , where the taxpayer
resides). See Golsen v. Comm' r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970). Consequently, the
circuit courts could split with respect to a particular issue. In such event,
the United States Supreme Court might hear the case in order to resolve the
issue.
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REGULATING CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIPS IN
THE WORKPLACE-ARE "LOVE CONTRACTS" THE
ANSWER?

by
Marlene Barken*
Joanne Barken*

With the entrance of woman into the workplace and the
current American trend to spend more time at work, office
dating is on the rise. Vault's 2005 Office Romance Survey
revealed that fifty-eight percent of employees have been
involved in an office romance, up from forty-six percent in
2003. 1 Another survey found that ninety-two percent of over
31 ,000 men and women questioned admitted to finding a
coworker attractive and flirting with him or her?
While the office may be evolving into the hottest
singles scene, these statistics give employers plenty of reasons
to fear potential lawsuits. Completely prohibiting dating
among co-workers has proven impractical and difficult to
enforce. One major concern is a sexual harassment claim
following a bad breakup between two employees. Legal
Assistant, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, NYC
In light of the inevitability of romance in the workplace, many
employers are experimenting with "love contracts" to protect
themselves from potential sexual harassment claims.

*Associate Professor of Legal Studies
Ithaca College School of Business
*B.S. Cornell University, 2005
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Employees wishing to date one another must first sign a written
contract that the relationship is in fact consensual, and that they
are willing to therefore waive their right to bring a sexual
harassment claim in court.
This appears to be a safe
compromise for employers, offering their workers the freedom
to date but preventing possible liability. To date, such
contracts have not been tested in court, but they are likely to
raise a variety of problems. Invasion of privacy, actual validity
as a contract, and exposure to other forms of liability are only a
few of the reasons that love contracts are not the best way to
handle the rise in office dating.

conduct is the basis for employment decisions affecting the
plaintiff. Secondly, the Court held that "a plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment... [and that in order for] sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of (the victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment.4 "
Meritor held that
discrimination under Title VII is not limited to a tangible loss.
"The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'
evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women in employment. 5 "
Though the Court did not determine the standard for liability, it
agreed with the EEOC that courts should look to agency
principles for guidance. The Court explained that while
employer liability is not strict, employers are not immune
simply because they have policies prohibiting sexual
harassment. Rather, liability will depend on the adequacy,
timing, and effectiveness of their remedial action. 6

This paper will first review the background case law on
sexual harassment that formed the basis for the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) guidelines
regarding sexual favoritism and consensual relationships in the
workplace. Secondly, the authors will discuss recent state and
federal cases involving paramours and failed consensual
relationships between co-workers. The authors then will
explain why love contracts may not be the most effective
method by which to address the changing norms of
fraternization on the job and will offer management
suggestions for a more practical and lawful way to avoid the
negative fall-out of consensual relationships in the workplace.

A. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Claims

More recent Supreme Court decisions have increased the
need for employers to be proactive in avoiding sexual
harassment claims. Both Faragher v. City of Boca Raton7 and
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth8 helped to clarify the extent of
the employer's liability, which the Court had failed to fully
address in Meritor. Prior to the holdings in these two later
cases, Title VII plaintiffs were encouraged to "state their
claims in quid pro quo terms, which in tum put expansive
pressure on the definition. 9"

In the 1986 decision, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the
Supreme Court provided distinct definitions of the two existing
forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work
environment. 3 Quid pro quo is the clear situation where
plaintiff's submission to or rejection of unwelcome sexual

In Burlington Industries the plaintiff, Ellerth, was forced
to endure remarks and gestures of a sexual nature, as well as
threats to deny her tangible job benefits from an employee in a
supervisory position. Although those threats were not carried
out, and in fact Ellerth was promoted once, she chose to leave

TITLE VII AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
DISCRIMINATION
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10

her job, but did not report the abuse until after she had quit.
Similarly, Faragher was subjected to physical and verbal
harassment by her supervisors. She also chose not to voice her
II
.
comp1amts to management.
The Supreme Court sought to impose agency principles
of vicarious liability for damages caused by the exploitation of
supervisory authority and to encourage employers to prevent
instances of sexual harassment. In both cases, the Court found
that
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to
a victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to
liability or damages, subject to proof by a
of the evidence.. . No
preponderance
affirmative defense is available, however, when
the supervisor's harassment culminates in a
. 12
tangt.ble emp 1oyment actiOn.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the employer's
vicarious liability can be limited if the employer is able to
prove that "it acted reasonably in preventing or correcting
sexual harassment, or that the employee acted unreasonably in
failing to utilize the employer's preventive or corrective
. .
13,
opportumtles.

B. Sexual Favoritism
The EEOC has also provided guidance for employers on
what claims are cognizable under Title VII, and the
Commission's guidelines are accorded deference in sexual

harassment cases. 14 In a 1990 policy document, the EEOC
addressed the extent to which employers can be held liable for
unlawful sex discrimination by persons who were qualified for
but were denied an employment opportunity or benefit because
15
they did not submit to sexual advances or requests. Here the
EEOC explored how three different manifestations of "sexual
favoritism" in the workplace might adversely affect the
employment opportunities of third parties in such a way as to
create an actionable charge of either "implicit" quid pro quo
16
harassment and/or hostile work environment harassment.
First, the Commission looked at isolated instances of
preferential treatment based on consensual romantic
relationships. Though perhaps unfair and offensive, such
favoritism does not discriminate against men or women in
violation of Title VII because both are equally disadvantaged
for reasons other than their genders 17 • This principle has come
to be known as the "paramour rule" because the non-paramour
is disadvantaged simply because of the supervisor's romantic
preferences, not because of any illegal discriminatory activity.
Second, the Commission dealt with favoritism based on
coerced sexual conduct. If the relationship at issue was not
consensual, then other qualified men and women may be able
to establish a Title VII violation by showing that in order to
obtain a promotion, it would have been necessary to grant
sexual favors. In addition, they would have standing to
challenge the favoritism on the basis that they were injured as a
18
result of the discrimination suffered by their co-worker. The
third category is widespread favoritism of consensual sexual
partners. The EEOC's position is that when such behavior
permeates the workplace, those who do not welcome such
conduct may have a cause of action based on the creation of a
.
19
hostl.1 e environment.
The memorandum heavily relied on the 1988 case of
Broderick v. Ruder20 to further explain how widespread sexual
favoritism can violate Title VII. The case involved allegations
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by Catherine Broderick, a staff attorney at the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), that two male supervisors had
engaged in sexual relationships with secretaries who later
received promotions, cash awards and other job benefits, and
that the plaintiff herself had been subjected to isolated
instances of unwanted sexual advances by her supervisor. One
supervisor repeatedly pressured her to let him give her a ride
home, and when she finally accepted, he barged into her
apartment and toured the premises, including her bedroom.
Though intrusive, there was no physical contact. The same
supervisor regularly made crude jokes in the office and
maintained a known and visible liaison with one of the
secretaries. A different supervisor, the Regional Administrator,
became drunk at an office party and untied the plaintiffs
sweater and kissed her and another female employee.
Throughout her eight year tenure at the SEC, the plaintiff had
demonstrated her capabilities as an attorney, but the friction
with her supervisors escalated over the excessive socializing in
the office and Broderick's unwillingness to be a "team player."
Over time, the plaintiffs performance ratings deteriorated as a
result of upper management's growing resentment of her
21
refusal to 'go along, in order to get along'.

between and among employees. 24 " The defendant argued that
Title VII was not intended to regulate sexual morality in the
workplace. The court readily dismissed these contentions.
While consensual sexual relations in exchange for tangible
employment benefits might not create a cause of action for the
willing recipient, such advances, for those who do not find
them welcome, do create and contribute to a sexually hostile
working environment. 25

The District Court had little trouble finding that the
conduct of Broderick's supervisors created a hostile work
environment, undermined the plaintiffs motivation and work
performance, and deprived her and other female employees of
opportunities for job advancement22 .
Any documented
deficiencies in her work performance were directly attributable
23
to the general atmosphere in which she worked.
The
defendant maintained that Broderick's claims were really for
quid pro quo harassment and that other than the two isolated
situations described above, she was not sexually harassed. Any
sexual misconduct by supervisory personnel was not directed at
Broderick and was merely part of the "social/sexual interaction

The EEOC endorsed the court's theory, but significantly,
it noted that "these facts could also support an implicit ' quid
pro quo' harassment claim (italics added) since the managers,
by their conduct, communicated a message to all female
employees in the office that job benefits would be awarded to
those who participated in sexual conduct. 26" The Commission
went on to state that in a situation where management
personnel regularly solicited sexual favors from subordinate
employees in return for job benefits, those who did not
willingly consent or welcome this conduct might be able to
establish that the conduct created a hostile environment, even if
they were not directly solicited. Such conduct is actionable
because it communicates a message to all employees that job
benefits are conditioned on acquiescence to sexual relations.27
Facts such as those that arose in Broderick require an analysis
that partially blurs the distinction between quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment.
C. Consensual Relationships Gone Awry

The EEOC 's 1990 Policy Guidance has not been revised,
and to date, no federal court of appeal has issued an opinion
finding that the complained-of consensual favoritism was
sufficiently widespread to create a hostile environment. 28 Until
this past year, no state supreme court had directly addressed the
issue?9 Then in July of 2005, the California Supreme Court
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ruled in Miller v. Department ofCorrections30 that non-favored
employees could bring such a claim. The conduct revealed in
this case goes well beyond the SEC's loose, fraternity party
atmosphere under scrutiny in Broderick.

Finally, in 1998, Miller and three other employees filed a
confidential complaint with Kuykendall's supervisor, stating
that the "institution was out of control. 34 " Brown soon learned
of Miller's cooperation with the ensuing internal investigation,
and Brown and Yamamoto began a campaign of ostracism
against Miller and regularly interfered with her orders.
Kuykendall withdrew accommodations that Miller received
due to a physical disability. On one occasion, Brown had an
angry confrontation with Miller and followed her home. Miller
then obtained a restraining order against her, 35 and the
plaintiffs brought an action for sexual harassment pursuant to
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.

The co-plaintiffs in Miller were two female corrections
employees, Edna Miller and her assistant, Frances Mackey,
who claimed sex discrimination, harassment and retaliation by
their supervisor, Kuykendall, and his three paramours (Brown,
Bibb, and Patrick) who were also employed by the Department
of Corrections. In soap opera fashion, the saga went on from
1991 until 1998 and was carried over to a second correctional
facility as Kuykendall arranged transfers and promotions for
his "women". The three frequently squabbled over him,
sometimes in emotional scenes witnessed by other employees,
and they openly boasted to the plaintiffs about their ability to
influence Kuykendall. Brown, in particular, flaunted her affair,
and when vying for a promotion for which Miller was more
qualified, Brown announced to Miller that Kuykendall would
have to give it to her, otherwise she would "take him down
with her knowledge of every scar on his body" (internal quotes
omitted).31 The situation worsened when another female
warden, Yamamoto, became close with Brown. It is not clear
whether they were engaged in a lesbian relationship, but they
teamed up against Miller to make her life miserable. The
plaintiffs suffered verbal abuse, demotions, reduced pay,
threats, and in one instance Brown physically assaulted Miller
and held her captive for two hours. When plaintiff Mackey
sought help to release Miller, Yamamoto would not
intervene.32
Kuykendall refused to investigate Miller's
complaints of harassment, citing his relationship with Brown,
and her relationship with Yamamoto. He told Miller that he
should have chosen her, which she took to mean that he should
33
have had an affair with her instead of Brown.

Despite the sexually charged atmosphere at the state
prison and the events unleashed by Kuykendall's multiple
affairs, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the California Department of Corrections. The trial court and
the Court of Appeals reasoned that the supervisor's grant of
favorable employment opportunities to the three women with
whom he was having concurrent affairs did not constitute
sexual harassment of non-favored employees because there had
been no attempts to coerce sexual relations from them, and
non-favored employees of both genders would be equally
disadvantaged. Relying heavily on the EEOC memorandum,
the California Supreme Court disagreed. It held instead that
the facts of the case indicated that sexual favoritism in this
workplace had indeed become so widespread that the message
was that employees were sexual "playthings" for the boss. The
situation could constitute an actionable hostile environment.
The lower courts erred in refusing to let a jury consider the
plaintiffs' claims. 36
Certainly, the rather lurid facts in the Miller case are
unusual. Nonetheless, it raises new concerns for management.
Plaintiffs may now allege (and courts may allow juries to
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decide) that consensual sexual behavior and fraternization
among colleagues, particularly where there is a supervisorsupervisee relationship, creates a workplace that is permeated
with widespread sexual favoritism and hence establishes a
.
37
h ostl'1 e environment.
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In order to put Miller into perspective, it is worth
returning to the case law that has developed under the wellestablished paramour rule and a corresponding line of cases
that focuses on employment actions that are based on
underlying personal animosity resulting from a failed romantic
involvement. These cases demonstrate that the employer is
generally insulated from liability for sexual harassment, as long
as the initial relationship was consensual.

State courts, in construing similar provisions against
discrimination, have likewise held that as long as the favoritism
is based on personal romantic preference, not coercion, there is
no actionable discrimination on the basis of gender. For
example, in Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., the plaintiff,
an at-will employee, sought relief for reverse sex
discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination, claiming that fabricated charges of sexual
harassment were brought against him and that when he retained
an attorney, he was dischar?ed so that his supervisor' s
paramour could be promoted. 4 The plaintiff was unable to
produce any evidence that had he been a woman, he would not
have been fired. Moreover, management had the right to fire
an at-will employee for a false cause or for any cause, unless it
violated public policy, and hiring an attorney is not a
"protected activity." The firing may have been unfair, but the
court concluded that it was not illegal. 43

The chief case in point is Decintio v. Westchester County
Medical Center, where seven male respiratory therapists
claimed that they were denied a promotion that went to a
woman with whom the Program Administrator was having an
affair.38 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
clearly stated voluntary, romantic relationships cannot form the
basis of a sex discrimination suit under either Title VII or the
Equal Pay Act. 39 "The proscribed differentiation under Title
VII .. . must be a distinction based on a person's sex, not on his
or her sexual affiliations," and there must be "a causal
connection between the gender of the individual or class and
the resultant preference or disparity.40" For Title VII purposes,
the court found no justification for defining "sex" so broadly as
to include an ongoing, consensual romantic association. Any
other interpretation " ... would involve the EEOC and federal
41
courts in the policing of intimate relationships. "

Employers thus may find some comfort in Decintio and
its progeny because employment decisions that are the result of
isolated instances of favoritism will not give rise to successful
discrimination charges. Employers should recognize, however,
that even isolated acts of favoritism may nonetheless contribute
to a general perception of unfairness and may lead to poor
morale and distrust. Employers should also be concerned that
such preferential treatment does not begin to permeate the
workplace in a way that could later be deemed "widespread".
Along this spectrum, employers also need to worry about the
flip side of romantic relationships in the workplace--those that
go sour. Numerous cases address the problems of personal
animus dictating employment decisions and/or negatively
affecting the work place following a failed relationship. While
again, employers are protected from Title VII claims in these
cases, the facts are often nasty and disruptive to the workplace.

PARAMOURS AND PERSONAL ANIMOSITY

A. The Paramour Rule
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B. Personal Animosity
In Succar v. Dade County School Board, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that any analysis under a hostile
environment theory must focus on whether the complaining
employee was targeted because of his or her gender, and that
44
personal feuds cannot be turned into sex discrimination cases.
Plaintiff Succar, who was married, had carried on a year long
affair with another teacher, Lorenz, when Lorenz began
threatening Succar's wife and son. Succar's wife obtained a
restraining order against Lorenz, and the extra-marital affair
ended soon after. Lorenz was extremely bitter, and she began
to verbally and physically harass Succar, publicly embarrassing
him in front of colleagues and students. Succar claimed that
the school principal took insufficient steps to remedy the
situation, and he subsequently filed a complaint alleging hostile
work environment sexual harassment. Agreeing with the
district court, the Court of Appeals observed that "Title VII
prohibits discrimination; it is not a shield against harsh
treatment at the work place.45" Lorenz's harassment of the
plaintiff was not due to his gender, but rather her anger and
46
disappointment at having been jilted.
The following year, the same court applied the reasoning
in Succar to a claim arising out of a consensual relationship in
the quid pro quo context. In Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace,
Florida, plaintiff Houldsworth engaged in a consensual
47
relationship with Klein for approximately one year.
Klein
continued to romantically pursue Houldsworth after she ended
the affair. Although Klein had a supervisory position in
Houldsworth ' s department, her immediate supervisor was
Florence Lewis-Begin, a friend of Klein's wife. Houldsworth's
job evaluations began to deteriorate once she terminated the
relationship, and when the City Manager learned of the
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problems he commenced an investigation and Klein was
ordered to seek other employment. Nonetheless, Houldsworth
continued to receive poor evaluations from Lewis-Begin, and
Houldsworth ultimately resigned, claiming constructive
discharge. 48
Citing Succar, the Court ruled that any
harassment Houldsworth suffered was attributable to her failed
consensual relationship with Klein and the feeling of enmity it
engendered in both Klein and Lewis-Begin. She did not meet
the Title VII requirement of a showing that the altered terms
and conditions of employment were "because of ... sex. 49 "
New York's prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of sex pursuant to Executive Law Sect. 296(1)(a) tracks
the language of Title VII. The statutory term "sex" has
likewise been interpreted to be synonymous with "gender," and
does include variants of sexual activity, liaisons, or
attractions. 50 Thus, in Mauro v. Orville, a legal secretary who
had an intimate relationship with her boss, an attorney, could
not sustain a claim of discrimination due to her sex when he
discharged her in order to reconcile with his wife.5 1 A plaintiff
would need to demonstrate that there were unwelcome sexual
advances after termination of the consensual relationship in
order to support a claim that the discharge was motivated by
gender. 52
The foregoing cases establish that employees will not
succeed in a Title VII suit when the complained of employment
actions were taken to alleviate strained relations following the
breakup of a consensual union. They also illustrate, however,
how uncomfortable such situations may become, and how they
may draw other members of the work force into the fray.
Much like any acrimonious divorce, the resulting fall-out is
divisive as co-workers take sides, and at a minimum, such
intrigue is a distraction most employers would rather avoid.
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EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH EEOC
GUIDELINES
While case law shows that sexual favoritism as a result of
a consensual relationship and allegations of sexual harassment
in the form of personal animosity are extremely difficult cases
for a plaintiff to make out, sexual harassment suits are still
something to be feared by employers. In 2005 the EEOC
reported that 12,679 charge receipts were filed and resolved
under Title VII claiming sexual harassment discrimination as
an issue. Costs are high for businesses fighting these serious
allegations, and companies paid a total of $4 7.9 million in
monetary benefits. (This figure does not include damages
awarded from litigation/ 3
What can employers glean from these decisions? It is
essential to develop and to uphold a strict sexual harassment
policy in the workplace. Without one a company will be
unable to defend itself against sexual harassment claims that
may arise.
Aside from potential financial losses, these
statistics prove that sexual harassment continues to be a
problem in the workforce, and employers must be proactive in
protecting their employees. Furthermore, companies need to
be aware of how the national rise in office dating may affect
their operation, and they should familiarize themselves with the
different options for handling consensual relationships so that
they can become equipped to deal with the ramifications of a
traumatic break-up in the workplace.
Before employers look for ways to completely eliminate
the possibility of a romance budding between two co-workers
(instilling a simple non-fraternization policy), they should
consider how the relationship will affect the business if it goes
well. Depending on the size and nature of a company, office
relationships can have a positive influence.
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Having a love interest at the office can make employees
overall more content in life. Being happy is proven to make
people more motivated, productive, and physically healthier
than those who are unhappy.54 Employees may be less likely
to rush home at the end of the day if they know that staying late
to finish their assignments means that they can take a dinner
break in the cafeteria with their significant other. In addition,
the couple will share a common interest: their line of work.
This could lead to job related brainstorming outside of the
office. Couples may also feel the desire to impress each other,
and work to their highest ability in order to appear smart and
competent in the eyes of their loved one. By allowing people
to date each other at work, employers have the potential to gain
more hours, enthusiasm, motivation, and productivity from
their employees all while making their staff happier in life.
Employers should weigh the costs and benefits of
allowing consensual relationships to take place at work, but
they cannot ignore the fact that in today's work environment
officemates are probably already dating. A more recent
approach to handling this challenging situation is the
development of the love contract.

REVEALING ALL-LOVE CONTRACTS AND
PRIVACY

A. Creation of the Love Contract
Looking for an innovative approach to accommodate
office romances and worried employers, the San Francisco firm
of Littler Mendelson developed the first love contract in 2000.
Since then the firm has completed hundreds of contracts for
clients over the past few years.55 In a 2005 article published by
Stephen Tedesco, a partner at Littler, he recommends love
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contracts to employers as a means of protecting employers
from both sexual harassment claims and sexual favoritism
disputes. 56 He states that a love contract "documents that the
employee's relationship is consensual, they are aware
company's sexual harassment policies and agree to mamtam
proper, professional office behavior and, if the employees are
in a supervisor-subordinate working relationship, both parties
agree that one will transfer to another department or work
group. 5 7"

Perhaps the biggest concern with love contracts is that
they have yet to be tested in the courts. Though they borrow
concepts from contract and employment law, it is possible that
they could lead to claims of invasion of personal privacy.60
Employees asked to sign such an agreement might feel
compelled to reveal an extramarital affair or a homosexual
relationship. A few states, including New York, Colorado,
North Dakota, and California have privacy protection statutes
that afford employees some degree of protection for nonemployment related activities.61

There are several apparent benefits to enforcing the use
of these contracts. First, it confirms in writing that the
relationship is in fact voluntary. Furthermore, it ensures that
the involved parties are aware of the company's policies
towards consensual relationships and sexual harassment. Some
practitioners recommend holding a separate discussion with
each employee to ensure that the relationship is truly
consensual, and using this meeting as an opportunity to review
the company's sexual harassment policy and complaint
procedure. Employees should also be advised that signing the
agreement is not a condition of employment and that they may
want to consult with counsel before signing. A key component
of the contract is that employees should be required to notify
the employer if and when the relationship ends and the
employer should closely monitor the post-dating situation for
problems. 58 Finally, it guarantees that if the relationship falls
through, any potential disputes will be handled through
mediation or binding arbitration. Advocates of love contracts
argue that these methods will be more time and cost effective
for all of the involved parties, and will not tie up the court
system.59

B. Off-hours Dating and Privacy

Though several cases have been filed in New York in
both state and federal court questioning whether personal
employee relationships are protected "recreational activities,"
no clear consensus has yet emerged, and love contracts were
not at issue. 62 The reasoning in these cases is nonetheless
interesting and instructive for employers considering the
introduction of the rather intrusive love contract.
In pertinent part, New York Labor Law §201-d states that:
2. Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be
unlawful for any employer or employment
agency to refuse to hire, employ or license,
or to discharge from employment or
otherwise discriminate against an individual
in compensation, promotion or terms,
conditions or privileges of employment
because of:
c. an individual's legal recreational activities
outside work hours, off of the employer's
premises and without use of the employer's
equipment or other property. 63
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The statute defines "recreational activities" as:
any lawful, leisure-time activity, for which
the employee receives no compensation and
which is generally engaged in for recreational
purposes, including but not limited to sports,
games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the
viewing of television, movies and similar
. 1 64
matena.
The key case that examined the language and purpose of
the statute is New York v. Wal-Mart Stores, in which Wal-Mart
had discharged two of its employees for violation of its
"fraternization" policy that prohibited a "dating relationship"
between a married employee and another employee other that
..
his or her own spouse.65 In a somewhat convo1uted opm10n,
the majority held that "dating" was distinct from a
"recreational activity" because its key component was
"amorous interest," and as such, it could not be included in the
statute's clearly delineated categories of leisure-time
activities. 66 Since the indispensable element of dating, "in fact
its raison d'etre, is romance, either pursued or realized," it
could not be counted as an activity within the purview of the
statute. 67 Judge Yesawitch, in a strong dissent, argued that the
statute encompasses all social activities, whether or not they
have a romantic element, "for it includes any lawful activity
pursued for recreational purposes and undertaken during
leisure time. 68 " The majority's holding gave no protection to
social relationships that might contain a romantic aspect,
regardless of the participants marital status, or the impact of
69
their relationship on their capacity to perform their jobs.
Judge Y esawitch urged instead that the statute be read broadly
to effect its remedial purpose:
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... given the fact that the Legislature's primary
intent in enacting Labor Law Sec. 201-d was to
curtail employers' ability to discriminate on the
basis of activities that are pursued outside of
work hours, and that have no bearing on one's
ability to perform one's job, and concomitantly
to guarantee employees a certain degree of
freedom to conduct their lives as they please
during non-working hours, the narrow
interpretation adopted by the majority is
indefensible. 70
The New York Court of Appeals has never addressed the
issue, and the Wal-Mart decision has been followed in
numerous cases. For example, in Bilquin v. Roman Catholic
Church, the plaintiff, a Pastoral Associate for Faith Formation,
had no cause of action under Labor Law § 201-d(l)(b) for
wrongful termination when she was not renewed for
employment due to her cohabitation with the husband of a
parishioner. 71 Likewise, in Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
plaintiff had no cause of action when he was dismissed for
having an extramarital affair with a co-employee. 72 Nor did he
have a cause of action for any form of discrimination on the
basis of sex or marital status, because his female paramour was
single, and she was also terminated. 73
The only federal case to date, however, may be most
predictive of the future of privacy claims that arise out of
consensual office romances. In McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance
America Corp., the plaintiff, an officer of the company, was
romantically involved with another officer. Despite the fact
that the company had no written anti-fraternization policy, the
plaintiff was passed over for promotion and ultimately fired
because of their dating. 74 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reluctantly agreed with the district court that its
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decision was governed by the Third Department's decision in
Wal-Mart, and thus it dismissed McCavitt's complaint on the
grounds that dating is not a protected recreational activity.
Absent persuasive evidence that the New York Court of
Appeals would reach a different conclusion regarding the scope
of "recreational activity" under the statute, the Court felt bound
to apply the interpretation of New York's intermediate
appellate court? 5 Circuit Judge McLaughlin, in his concurring
opinion, urged that the New York Court of Appeals, if given
the chance, should reach the opposite conclusion. Endorsing
Judge Yesawich's reasoning quoted above, Judge McLaughlin
added a common sense, reality check: "Romance has a
distinctly distinguished history of originating in office contacts.
It is one of the most cliched of movie plots ... (and quoting
Justice Frankfurter), 'There comes a point where this Court
should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men."' 76

to dinner with one another. Signing an agreement turns the
casual date into a big commitment, and couples are far more
likely to simply hide their relationship. 77 Furthermore, since
these contracts have yet to be tested in court, their validity may
not hold up. Employees who feel pressured to sign such
agreements could later argue that the circumstances were
coercive in that the employer gave the tacit message that
signing (and waiving certain rights to sue) was an implied
condition of continued employment. Thus love contracts may
"poison the waters" and leave the employer wide open to other
potential forms of liability. Once the employees have signed
the agreement, there is a written record that the employer is
aware of the relationship. It is likely that such admissions will
reveal relations between employees that may be homosexual,
inter-racial, mixed religions, extramarital, etc. If one or both
members of the couple later suffer a tangible employment loss,
they may be able to make out a discrimination case against the
employer on the basis of grounds other than sex. Finally, love
contracts send the negative message to the employees of the
firm that their employer is limiting their rights to their own
privacy, as well as limiting their protection from sexual
harassment if that situation does arise.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
EMPLOYERS

A. Avoid Using Love Contracts
The rise in office dating is clearly a sticky situation for
employers to handle. Trying to find a balance between turning
a blind eye and ruling the office romance scene with an iron
fist is more difficult than it sounds. It is not surprising that the
safety net love contracts appear to cast for employers has
become so popular. However, it is unlikely that these contracts
will be of any real use to the employer, and they are not worth
the attorney fees it would cost to have them drafted.
Forcing employees to sign one of these so-called "love"
contracts places them in a very awkward and unnatural
position. It's doubtful that two people will decide to consult
with the Human Resources department before they even go out

B. Protecting Employees While Protecting the Company
To create the most productive work atmosphere,
employers should be focusing on making their employees feel
safe and content. Instead of limiting the rights of their
workers, companies should focus their efforts and legal
resources on drafting strong policies against sexual harassment,
should educate their employees on how to follow them, and
should regularly monitor and consistently enforce such
policies.
Statistically it is inevitable that consensual
relationships will occur at most operations. Employers need to
achieve a balance between decorum in the work place and the
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extremely offensive behavior exhibited in Miller, and to a
lesser extent, in Broderick. Employment law practitioners have
offered the following advice to navigate this terrain:

voluntarily come forward and to sign love contracts, may
ultimately find themselves sued in privacy actions. Given
these multiple constraints, an employer's best option is to
emphasize a strict sexual harassment policy and to require a
professional atmosphere in the work place. This method will
provide support for employers in court, but more importantly,
it will send a positive message to employees that management
wants to protect their rights, not to restrict them.

Employers should keep in mind the key factors
behind the Miller court's decision (and the
EEOC's policy) in order to evaluate the legal
risk to the company including, (1) the number
of employees with whom the supervisor had
sexual relationships, (2) the number of
supervisors engaged in sexual relationships
with subordinates, (3) how public the
relationships are in the office and the
interaction between the employees who are the
supervisor's paramours and the supervisor. (4)
whether the employees having
these
relationships are receiving benefits that other
employees are not receiving and which are not
justified by performance or other merit-based
reasons; (5) whether the employees that are
having these relationships with supervisors
wield power over the employees who are not in
such relationships; and (6) whether the overall
feeling in the workplace is that in order to be
promoted or receive equal treatment, an
employee must have sexual relations with the
.
78
supervisor.
To date, the case law indicates that it is extremely
difficult for employees to successfully claim discrimination on
the basis of sex if they are discharged because of either an
ongoing consensual union or because of strained relations
following a breakup. Nonetheless, employers who insert
themselves in their workers' private lives by either imposing
unrealistic non-fraternization policies or requiring workers to
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EMINENT DOMAIN AFTER KELO V. NEW LONDON: IS
CHANGE IMMINENT?
By
Dennis D. DiMarzio*, Glenna Summer**, and Lonnie
Jackson***

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has historically
played the critical role of hearing and deciding cases that
ultimately define our society as one oflaw. Many of the
Court's decisions have been handed down with little fanfare,
and any national publicity and debate faded soon thereafter.
Sometimes, however, the Court renders a landmark decision
which involves such a fundamental right and has such
immediate and long term implications that a firestorm of
national publicity and debate continue long after the decision
date. One June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court decided such a
case, Kelo v. New London, 1 an eminent domain decision, and
the firestorm of publicity and debate continues. In Keto, 2 the
Court dramatically expanded the eminent domain power of
government to take private property for "public purposes"
rather than "public use." The Court reasoned that a
Connecticut city could constitutionally take private property in
the name of economic development by a private developer.
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